consequent prolongation of the war to the point of defeat brought about the collapse of the Monarchy from within, its wartime diplomacy had left it without the support of any Power except defeated Germany." (It should be pointed out that Austria-Hungary never sought a separate peace. That would have invited a German invasion, backed by German Austrians. Austria's real problem was that Germany refused to give back Alsace-Lorraine, wanted vast swathes of the Baltic, not to mention control of the Balkans, Poland and Mitteleuropa and staked all on outright victory, even risking American entry into the war through unrestricted U-boat warfare. Clearly, therefore, the German alliance was all-important. Yet, as Gordon A. Craig pointed out in a brilliant article on 'The Military Cohesion of the Austro-German Alliance, 1914-1918,' 18 there was no military or diplomatic coordination between the two powers at all. Given that their 3.5 million fighting men would face at least 5 million from France, Russia and Serbia -not to mention the British Empire and later Italy and America -this was disastrous. In 1915, Conrad could even ask : "Well, what are our secret enemies the Germans up to, and what is that comedian the German Emperor doing?" Gerard E. Silberstein, The Troubled Alliance. German-Austria Relations, 1914 Relations, -1917 Relations, (1970 19 and Gary W. Shanafelt's The Secret Enemy. Austria-Hungary and the German Alliance, 1914 -1918 , East European Monographs (1985 20 show not merely how extensive the differences between the two powers were but how AustriaHungary, despite continuous defeats and the need for German military aid, not to say rescue, stoutly refused to buckle under German diplomatic pressure, continuously coming up instead with plans for Austrian domination of various parts of Europe and consistently refusing to commit herself definitively to the German scheme for Mitteleuropa, even after signing up to it at Spa. Silberstein has also written an important article 21 demonstrating how Conrad, as Austria-Hungary's military chiefof-staff, failed to dominate Austrian diplomacy, namely 'The High Command and Diplomacy in Austria-Hungary, 1914 -1916 . 22 The most recent and significant foray into Austro-Hungarian wartime diplomacy is Marvin Benjamin Fried's 2011 LSE doctoral thesis, War Aims and Peace Conditions: Austro-Hungarian Foreign Policy in the Balkans, July 1914 -May 1917 . This will be published in 2014 by Palgrave Macmillan, London, with the title The Final Stab at Glory: Austro-Hungarian War Aims in the Balkans, 1914 Balkans, -1918 Bündnis 1914 Bündnis -1918 Bündnis (2012 . 26 Fried insists in his work on three basic points: first, that Austro-Hungarian war aims were more offensive, expansionist and annexationist in the Balkans and in Poland than previously thought; secondly, that the foreign ministry remained in overall control of the process of war aims formulation in opposition to the army's policies and contrary to the German example; and thirdly, that the war was prolonged due to Austria-Hungary's at times almost delusional insistence on its principal war aims. True, at the start of the war, Vienna had few specific war aims in mind apart from defeating Serbia militarily and making her a tributary or dependent state. Yet as the war continued and as it became clear that it would not be a short one, more extensive war aims developed. Serbia, Vienna soon agreed, due to the influence of Tisza, the Hungarian premier, was neither to be annexed nor destroyed. Instead, she was to cede territory to Bulgaria, Albania and Greece but pay reparations to AustriaHungary which would also receive some territory as "strategically important border corrections". Specifically, these included the north-western corner of Serbia called the Mačva, the north-east of Serbia around Negotin, and Belgrade itself. It was also important that neither Bulgaria nor Germany should dominate the Western Balkans, which should be Austria-Hungary's exclusive sphere of influence. Tisza saw this as the most important war aim for the Monarchy. So, too, did Berchtold, who was willing to lose Galicia but not control of Serbia. Conrad, on the other hand, saw victory on the Eastern Front and the defeat of Russia as the key to any general peace, although he did realise the economic importance of the Balkans to the Monarchy. His plan, after Serbia's defeat, would become one of annexing the rump of Serbia, once Bulgaria had been paid off with Macedonia, annexing Montenegro and dismembering Albania. Yet continued military defeats always deprived him of any real influence. In any case, the ultimate commander in chief of the armed forces -Kaiser Franz Joseph 27 -tended only to discuss foreign policy with his foreign minister. Besides, Tisza had no intention of absorbing more Slavs into the Monarchy, an issue that Conrad simply dismissed or overlooked. Hungary, it would have to be part of Cisleithania in some sort of sub-dualist structure. Clearly, there were huge potential gains from acquiring a territory as large as Poland, but these were never apparent to Hungarians. One of these, Burián, on becoming foreign minister in 1915, displayed astonishing obduracy in face of military and civilian panic. He simply kept refusing any concessions to Italy, Romania or Bulgaria, despite the threat of Italian and Romanian intervention on the allied side. Once Serbia was defeated at the end of 1915 with German and Bulgarian help and the Russians had been defeated at Gorlice-Tarnów in the summer of 1915, however, Burián's position became close to Tisza's -rump Serbia would be dominated by Hungary which would populate it with Hungarian and German immigrant farmers but leave it nominally independent. The foreign ministry also wanted Albania to remain theoretically independent and neutral despite military occupation and Conrad's desire to annexe or dismember the country. Burián, however, agreed that Montenegro should lose its coast, the Lovćen plateau, which threatened the AustroHungarian naval base at Cattaro, plus some northern territory to Austria-Hungary; she should also lose territory to Albania. With the need for German support against the Brusilov Offensive in 1916 and against Romania which now entered the war, Austria-Hungary's diplomatic room for manoeuvre became limited. She gained little from Romania's defeat while Bulgaria pressured her for concessions in occupied Serbia and the Germans set their sights on the Albanian port of Valona. Meanwhile, Congress Poland was given constitutional independence at the end of 1916 but with no agreement over who would control it. Burián kept pressing for Austrian parity with Germany in Poland; indeed, control of Poland, if possible, remained an Austrian war aim. Despite hunger becoming the most pressing issue for the Monarchy by 1917, and despite the accession of a new Emperor -Karl I -who soon sacked Conrad, Burián and even Tisza, it proved impossible to change Habsburg foreign policy in any way. In March 1917, a minimum programme was agreed with Germany according to which the armies of the Central Powers would only retreat from Russia and the Balkans if the statu quo before 1914 was restored in east and west. A maximum programme gave Romania to Austria-Hungary and expanded territory for Germany in the East, territory whose extent would be defined according to later circumstances. Although the new foreign minister and emperor became identified with a desire for peace for various reasons, they never abandoned the established new order in the Balkans, assuming that 'minor' territorial adjustments in Serbia and Montenegro would be overlooked or allowed by the Allies at any peace conference. The Germans, on the other hand, not merely went on to plan huge annexations in the East, but came up with schemes for the wholesale economic reorganisation of Central Europe that would have subordinated the whole Habsburg Monarchy to Germany -in short, the plans for Mitteleuropa. By now, however, the question of food supplies to a starving Monarchy and the prospect of peace were the two issues most exercising the populations of Austria-Hungary. This meant that when Russia collapsed in revolution -which, it was feared would spread to the Monarchy -Czernin at Brest-Litovsk offered the whole of Poland -including Austrian Galicia -to Germany on condition that grain supplies from the Ukraine and Romania would reach starving Austria. (In fact, he had already offered the whole of Poland to Germany in discussions at the German army headquarters at Homburg on 3 April 1917, in order to encourage the Germans to make concessions over Alsace-Lorraine.) Austria-Hungary, however, was to keep her Balkan possessions. As it turned out, no grain came from the Ukraine, but Austria's cession of Cholm to that country so infuriated her Poles that there could no longer be any thought of an Austro-Polish solution, if indeed any prospect of one still existed. On the other hand, by 1918 the Monarchy's war aims had been fulfilled: Serbia and Russia had been crushed, Romania had ceded some strategic territory (the Iron Gates) to Austria-Hungary and agreed to border rectifications, and AustriaHungary still had a say in the future of Poland. Italy had been humiliated by the autumn of 1917 at Caporetto. Austria-Hungary had even fought off serious threats from Germany and Bulgaria to interfere in her occupation zones in Serbia, Montenegro and Albania. All enemy troops had been expelled from the lands of the Monarchy. All her own troops were fighting abroad. Hence the new army chief of staff, General Arz von Straußenburg, began making all sorts of plans for annexations in the Balkans, which the foreign ministry still opposed. In any case, the main problem was now hunger, the moral and physical collapse of the civilian and military populations, and strategic defeat. Karl attempted secret peace negotiations with the Entente through his brother-in-law Prince Sixtus of Bourbon-Parma, during which, without informing them, he had suggested that the Germans might surrender AlsaceLorraine. After the collapse of the Sixtus mission, Karl's subsequent humiliation and apparent diplomatic surrender to the Germans at Spa, and Czernin's resignation and replacement by the apparently imperturbable Burián, defeat was not far off. Burián, predictably, kept trying to get the Germans to guarantee the Monarchy's Balkan gains almost to the end of the war and still made Vienna's agreement to Mitteleuropa conditional on a Polish settlement. However, by the autumn of 1918, with everything everywhere collapsing, the allies no longer cared to guarantee the Monarchy's own survival and far less that of its military conquests in the Balkans when the war eventually ended. Fried makes an excellent case for the primacy of Balkan war aims in the wartime diplomacy of Austria-Hungary. It may be true that Conrad saw the eastern front and the struggle against Russia as being more important for military survival, something which objectively was true-a Russian army pouring through the Carpathians on to the Hungarian Great Plain represented a lethal threat to the Monarchy in a way that Serbian military strategy certainly never did nor could; it may be true, also, that Austria-Hungary saw the campaign against Italy as one against a traditional enemy and one, therefore, which united all populations of the Monarchy in enthusiasm for war; but diplomatically, it may be the case that the Balkans had been the cause of the war and thereafter remained at the heart of it for Austria-Hungary's leaders and policy-makers. The issue of Poland, however, should not be easily dismissed in the context of the war-aims of the Monarchy. Its control by, or even close association with, the Habsburgs would have added immeasurably to their prestige in a way that control of the Western Balkans could not have equalled. Still, Fried's contribution to the historiography of Austro-Hungarian wartime diplomacy is a fundamental one.
The War Itself
History has not been kind to the Habsburg army and its record in the First World War. The successor states of the Monarchy suppressed its memory and in any case the concept of a multi-national army imbued with a dynastic, anti-national ethos became an anomaly if not an embarrassment after 1918. The Soviet army was also multi-national, of course, but remained Greater Russian in ethos. 28 Nor did other developments help. In Austria, the old Austro-Hungarian general staff took control of the War Archive and defended its own record when writing up the seven-volume, official history of the war -Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg -so that defeat was placed on ethnic disloyalty rather than bad leadership. In particular, reputations such as that of the former chief of staff, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf had to be protected. 29 The shifting of blame on to unreliable nationalities coincided, of course, with the efforts of radical nationalists to prove that battlefield desertions were the result of the fact that Austria-Hungary had been the "prison of the peoples". The Czechs, Thomas Masaryk and Eduard Beneš were particularly adept in this regard, although Jaroslav Hašek's Good Soldier Švejk helped enormously, despite the fact that Hašek in his novel described Czech loyalty to the Habsburgs. 30 should consult its bibliography as well as that in Herwig's book for the older and more detailed literature. Rauchensteiner should also be supplemented by József Galántai, Hungary in the First World War (1989) . 46 There can be no doubt from all accounts of the war that Conrad's military record was deplorable and that the army's strategic leadership was appalling. 47 Much, much more than Britain's forces, those of Austria-Hungary were indeed 'lions led by donkeys' (although the British record is now defended). What then of the argument about the nationalities subverting the Austro-Hungarian war effort? There is an extremely peculiar article by Geoffrey Wawro, entitled 'Morale in the AustroHungarian Army: the Evidence of Habsburg Army Campaign Reports and Allied Intelligence Officers', 48 which has to be confronted in this context. Basing himself on the clearly undeniable and rather obvious fact that the Habsburg army had to be rescued by the Germans on all fronts as well as on the accounts of a handful of prisoners who surrendered to allied, mainly French captors, Wawro repeats all the charges made against the Habsburg army by its post-1918 detractors : "the First World War, it is argued here, revealed as never before Austria-Hungary's social, political and military weaknesses. I take issue not only with historians who suggest that the monarchy's survival through four years of total war was evidence of its essential durability and legitimacy, but also with those more temperate ones who assert that the army 'mixed' great successes and failures. Besides Austria's defensive victories on the Isonzo front, which consisted of some almost unassailable positions, the Habsburg army's record in the war was one of chronic failure." (p. 400) His conclusion (pp. 409-410) is : "In short, the evidence both of Habsburg army campaign reports and of Allied intelligence officers strongly suggests that the Austro-Hungarian army was indeed a 'prison of the nations'. Each major army campaign of the Great War revealed major nationality problems which called into question the Monarchy's very reason for being. Did the Habsburg Monarchy in fact unite and protect the small nations of East Central Europe against foreign domination, or was the Monarchy itself a foreign oppressor and, in the end a mere front for Reich German domination? Austria-Hungary's record in the Great War, from its early defeats to its final acceptance of Ludendorff's supreme command, suggests that the latter cannot be lightly ignored. The fact that there was some variation in the degree of loyalty or indifference within the various non-German ethnic groups, and that many German-Austrian soldiers shared in the general decline in morale does not alter the fact that the ethnic divisions within the army exacerbated by irredentist agitation on the home front, were a fundamental cause of its ineffectiveness under the strain of a modern war."
Wawro argues that the Habsburg army would have disintegrated much sooner had the Germans not propped it up or had it been subject to more allied offensives in the West. On the Italian front, he argues, the men were divided into reliable GermanAustrian and Hungarian troops and unreliable others, who were controlled by field 46 gendarmes and prevented from deserting. Meanwhile, the Germans had all sorts of nasty nick names for Slavs and Rumanian troops and generally called them 'cus' -"akin to nigger or wog". Perhaps, as an academic, Wawro is unacquainted with barrack-room language and behaviour. In any case, there are a host of objections to his arguments. First, the army was in contact with the Russians and did not go over to the enemy. In fact-see below -there is a great deal of mythology about the Czechs who supposedly did desert. Secondly, nothing at all took place in Habsburg ranks to compare with the "The overwhelming majority of Habsburg soldiers fought with determination and bravery. Certainly, they had persevered far longer than anyone in 1914 -including the generals -had considered they might. The multinational army, the least prepared for war of all Europe's major armies, offered unprecedented sacrifices against a host of well armed enemies. Its experience of total war was among the worst in Europe; its 5,000,000 casualties were comparable to France's terrible losses. The army's high level leadership was often poor, the Dual Monarchy failed to supply its troops properly, and there was little hope of ultimate victory. Yet the common soldiers of the multinational army endured, fighting for their Emperor-King and the honour of their regiments."
According to Schindler, these soldiers, in Austria-Hungary's greatest war, lived up to the reputations of Eugene of Savoy, the Archduke Charles and Vater Radetzky. They fought and died all over Central and Eastern Europe from the Adriatic to the Carpathians (p. 270): "Their now-forgotten sacrifices in a lost cause-triumphs at Valjevo, Gorlice, Doberdo, the Strypa, Caporetto and on the Tagliamento, as well as the defeats at Čer, Sztropkó, the Dukla Pass, Łuck and on the Piave -were enormous. By their great sacrifices, the soldiers of the wartime army proved themselves to be the last true 'Austrians', the last remaining defenders of the ancient Habsburg monarchy." Indeed, the American consul reported from Prague in January 1916 : "The Bohemian national spirit which was so rampant before the war has absolutely evaporated…whatever the cause may be, there is no questioning the fact that on the surface at least there is loyalty to the Government… It is not safe to say whether this attitude of the Czechs is due to official pressure, but the Czechs are certainly showing no spirit in defending what I had been led by the Germans to believe was the political creed of all of them, that is, the separation of Bohemia from Austria." 52 The Habsburg Empire crumbled because by 1918 its soldiers and civilians were starving and its bet on German military victory had failed. It was defeated neither by the subversion of the nationalities who fought bravely and loyally to the end nor on account of international diplomacy. Its own inability to reform or to make a compromise peace allowed the Allies to accept the new national governments already in place as the imperial government and family simply disappeared. 53 49 
Occupation policy
The initial campaigns against Serbia by Oskar Potiorek's army were accompanied by massacres of civilians and the taking of hostages, partly in retaliation for the murders of Austrian troops by Serbian partisans. The evidence is assembled briefly in chapter twenty of Rudolf Jeřábek's biography, Potiorek. General im Schatten von Sarajevo (1991). 54 The main book (so far) on the Austrian occupation of Serbia between 1915 and 1918, which also covers the events of 1914, is Jonathan E. Gumz, The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire in Habsburg Serbia, 1914 Serbia, -1918 Serbia, (2009 , 55 which is exceptionally well-researched and well-balanced and is based on thorough archival research in Vienna and Belgrade. Gumz places the Austro-Hungarian army at the centre of his picture and shows that its behaviour cannot be compared with that of the Nazis in the Second World War. Its outlook was backward-looking, determined to keep wars typical of the nineteenth century by giving Serbia the type of denationalised, apolitical, bureaucratic-absolutist regime it would have liked to see in Austria-Hungary itself. Despite atrocities and war crimes, there was no intention of annihilating or exterminating a racial enemy. The army, in fact, operated a fairly mild occupation policy aimed at denationalising the country. Civilian ration quotas were higher than in starving Austria itself, and Serbia in military eyes was to become the breadbasket for the army and its friends, not for the home front. Russian and German occupation policies elsewhere were much harsher. In Serbia, when repression failed, military law was used to overcome national resistance. In the end, the army seemed to have secured its aims and Austrian historians are now preparing to investigate wartime collaboration. This view of events is challenged, however, by the themes underlying Alan Kramer The other part of the Empire that experienced occupation in the First World War was Galicia, which twice passed from Austrian to Russian occupation. Slav inhabitants later deemed to have collaborated with the enemy were treated harshly; many were hanged by the Austrians while thousands of locals were forcibly transferred to other areas. The Jews of Galicia and Russian Poland, however, treated Austrian and German troops as liberators, which led to the Russians mistreating them when they retreated. It was very different from the Second World War :
Prisoners of War
Austro-Hungarian prisoners in the First World War found themselves overwhelmingly in Russian hands. Russia, in fact, took 54,146 officers captive and 2,057,000 of other ranks. In respect of nationality, 31 per cent were Hungarians, 30 per cent German Austrians, 7 per cent Romanians, 5 per cent Poles, 3 per cent Czechoslovaks, 3 per cent South Slavs, 2.5 per cent Jewish, and 0.5 per cent Italian. Officers were treated reasonably well. They were not forced to work and actually received a monthly stipend as laid down by the Hague Conventions. They were allowed to pursue hobbies and put on theatrical works in which better-looking younger males took the place of females. Those who were not officers, in stark contrast, endured appalling conditions in camps and were forced to work. Turkish prisoners of war received the worst treatment of all-being shunted around in boarded-up cattle wagons and sometimes left to die in them. Austrian prisoner-ofwar (POW) camps were often places of ill-treatment also. After the Russian revolution, POWs were allowed their freedom to fight for both sides in the Russian Civil War. 60,000 Czechs ended up backing the Whites and 100,000 Hungarians, the Reds. 59
Naval War
The 60 as previously noted, has nothing to say on the war itself, but it does include a useful article by Lothar Höbelt on Die Marine (pp. 687-763), which gives the nineteenth-century background. Another work which covers the immediate background is Milan N. Vego's Austro-Hungarian Naval Policy, 1904 Policy, -1914 Policy, (1996 , 61 which stresses that Austria-Hungary's naval policy was not the result of German pressure but was based on (p. 195) "the interplay of her needs to acquire the status of a great sea power in both the Adriatic and the Mediterranean." Curiously, however, he questions her need to build dreadnoughts (p. 194) : "Surely it would have been more sensible and valuable for Austria-Hungary to spend her limited funds on building smaller surface combatants and submarines than on dreadnoughts and semi-dreadnoughts?" Maybe, as shall be seen, this is due to his reading of the war at sea after 1914 backwards, but even then it is difficult to understand how Austria-Hungary could have become a "great sea power" without dreadnoughts or how she could have countered France and Italy in the Mediterranean and Adriatic during the war itself without them. As for the war itself, the reader is referred to works by Hans Hugo Sokol, Anthony F. Sokol and Lawrence Sondhaus. 62 Sondhaus is the author of several fine books on Habsburg military history, and The Naval Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1867-1918: Navalism, Industrial Development and the Politics of Dualism, his second book on Austrian naval policy in the nineteenth century, will surely become the standard one for Austria-Hungary's naval record during the First World War. The story itself is, following Sondhaus, quite straightforward. By 1912, Admiral Montecuccoli, backed by the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, had built up the AustroHungarian navy to be a force to be reckoned with in the Mediterranean even by Great Britain, which fearing for the safety of its fleet in Malta, not to mention the looming danger of Tirpitz's Risikoflotte in the North Sea, withdrew its ships to home waters and left the French to deal with the Austrians and Italians. By 1913, the fleet had some 871 officers, 18,000 active seamen and a 22,000 reserve. During the Balkan Wars 25,000 men had been on active duty. In 1913 the fleet also got a new Inspector, Rear Admiral Haus, who spoke seven languages, had circumnavigated the globe, had written a textbook on oceanography and was an expert on torpedoes. By now the fleet also had two dreadnoughts. In October 1913 the government approved a programme for four new dreadnoughts, three cruisers, six destroyers, two Danube monitors and a supply ship. Hungarian support was won by awarding building contracts to Fiume. The strategy planned by the fleet had been laid out by the Triple Alliance Naval Convention of October 1913 which foresaw the Italians cooperating with AustriaHungary, something that already looked unlikely given the secrecy of Italian naval exercises and the clashes taking place between Italians and Slovenes in Trieste. When war did break out, of course, the Italians were at first neutral and then hostile, leaving the Austrians to face first a superior French fleet and then a very superior combination of France and Italy. Haus's ambitions to win a second Trafalgar or Lissa had to be put aside. Even victory in battle over the French would have almost certainly left the Mediterranean open to Italian domination. Besides, the Austrians lacked coal supplies to fuel their fleet. These had traditionally been supplied by the British and Britain now, for the first time ever, was Austria's enemy. (Some ships, it was true, were oil-burning but problems of receiving oil from Austrian Galiciawhen it remained Austrian of course -simply exacerbated Austria's fuel problem. 63 ) After the failure of the Dardanelles, there was pressure on Haus to come out of port to attack the allies, but such a move, he emphasised, made "absolutely not the least strategic sense" (p. 267). When Italy entered the war, she brought fifteen battleships including four dreadnoughts, with a fifth almost ready for service. Haus was absolutely correct. The allies, however, were very wary of moving their own ships within range of the Austrians, so that the war at sea in the Mediterranean, just as in the North Sea, became a stand-off (Jutland in 1916 would only confirm this strategy drew a line at the mouth of the Adriatic and left the sea itself to Austria-Hungary. Only on two occasions did Haus break out. When Italy entered the war, the Austrians immediately attacked several points on the Italian coast, destroying a few bridges and railway tracks and killing a few military personnel and civilians. No ships were lost and Italian morale was depressed, even if the Italian coastal railway was little affected. Italy retaliated by using airships to bomb Sebenico and Pola, after which the Austrian naval air arm -43 sea planes to Italy's 27-began regular raids on Venice. Meanwhile, Austria-Hungary's submarines counted for most of her successes at sea against the enemy. The second outing by Austrian ships came during the so-called Battle of the Otranto Straits of May 1917, when they attacked the anti-submarine nets there and had a difficult job eluding Entente ships on their return. For the most part, the strategy of staying in port at Pola was a good one. As Sondhaus points out (pp. 294-295), this deployment protected the largest and most populous cities of the Adriatic, Trieste and Fiume, which otherwise faced only ineffective attacks by Italian torpedo boats, submarines and airships. The Italian naval squadron in Venice was compelled to remain in port and Venice itself could not be reinforced. Finally, fear of Austro-Hungarian submarines, torpedo boats and her fleet air arm foiled any Italian plan to dominate the Southern Adriatic and kept the large warships of the allies south of the Straits of Otranto. The navy could therefore protect the southern border of the Empire despite being vastly outnumbered. The role of Austro-Hungarian submarines and the fleet air arm should not therefore be neglected. In this respect, the reader should refer to the article by John Harbon, 'Franz Josef's Forgotten U-Boat Captains', 64 and to Peter Schupita, Die k.u.k. Seeflieger: Chronik und Dokumentation der ósterreichisch-ungarischen Marineluftwaffe, 1911 Marineluftwaffe, -1918 Marineluftwaffe, (1983 . 65 Before leaving the subject, however, one should stress that in 1917 Haus was an enthusiast for Germany's policy of unrestricted submarine warfare, with which he "agreed unreservedly" (although he died just days after it started). When warned that it might provoke US entry into the war, he "declared that no great anxiety need be felt." Ministers therefore reluctantly gave their consent to Austria-Hungary taking part, although the Empress was opposed and Emperor Karl only agreed "under angry protest". 
The War Economy
The only real sources for Austria's war economy until recently were the volumes produced in the 1920s by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 67 Fortunately, there are now a number of more general surveys of the AustroHungarian war economy. 68 The most recent and most accessible account, however, is that of Max-Stephan Schulze, 'Austria-Hungary's economy in World War I'. 69 The concluding paragraph (p. 107) of Schulze's article deserves to be quoted : "The main conclusions from the preceding discussion of Austria-Hungary's war economy can be summarised as follows. First, the war effort was sustained into 1918 on the basis of a rapidly decreasing resource base. Constrained by scarcity of input materials and cumulative labour shortages, aggregate output fell continuously over the course of the war. Moreover, the share of war expenditure in real GDP fell from an initial peak of 30 per cent (1914/15) to about 17 per cent in 1917/18. Hence the scale of mobilization, both in absolute terms and relative to the size of the economy, was small to that achieved in major belligerent economies such as the United Kingdom and Germany. Second, the Allied blockade worked and its impact was augmented by a serious lack of foreign exchange: Austria-Hungary's foreign trade was far too limited to reduce significantly the shortage of essential war materials and foodstuffs. Third, the Empire's complex macropolitical structure, a legacy of the 1867 constitutional compromise between Austria and Hungary, undermined the efficiency and effectiveness of intra-empire resource allocation and utilisation. Fourth, a small domestic capital market proved incapable of sustaining wartime borrowing at high levels. After a short-lived rise in the initial stages of the war, the debt/GDP ratio remained just above peacetime levels. To the extent that Austria-Hungary did fight the war on the cheap, that was not an outcome of choice, but of necessity in light of inadequate resources. Finally, the persistent and widespread food scarcity and resultant physical exhaustion of both civilian population and the armed forces was a key factor in bringing about the collapse of the Habsburg Empire." "The failure of the railways was very instrumental in the final economic and military collapse since there was often large amounts of fuel, raw material, and finished products that could not be delivered. The ammunition shortages experienced in the last major Austro-Hungarian offensive against Italy in June 1918 was second only to the failure in military tactics in contributing to the defeat of the Imperial Army… These shortages reduced the number of active artillery batteries in Conrad's forces by fifty…the Army High Command calculated that the army needed an additional 4,500 railway cars to supply all the food needed on the eve of the offensive…Transportation must be considered the Monarchy's Achilles Heel. Even more than material shortages, industrial firms cited insufficient transportation as the major reason for production shortages and work stoppages during the war." Nonetheless, he is certainly right in pointing to food shortages as a key factor in the defeat of the Empire, a factor exacerbated, as he rightly points out, by the actions of the Hungarian government. Apart from the relevant volumes of the Carnegie Endowment mentioned above, the classical work on the topic is Ottokar Landwehr's Hunger: Die Erschöpfungsjahre der Mittelmächte, 1917 Mittelmächte, -1918 Mittelmächte, (1931 70 (1974) . 71 The key article is Horst Haselsteiner, 'The Habsburg Empire in World War I : Mobilization of Food Supplies. '72 Haselsteiner rightly states : "Almost independent of the events of the war and the international situation, the feeding of the army and of the civilian population became a question of survival for Austria-Hungary (p. 87)." He points out that before 1914 Austria-Hungary was self-sufficient in grain, but on military advice that the war would be a short one, no plans had been made for the stockpiling of foodstuffs. This was a fatal error. As the war went on, key grain growing areas of the Empire were lost (Galicia), refugees had to be fed, harvests failed, Hungary refused Austrian requests for aid, expected supplies from defeated Romania and the Ukraine proved illusory, and requisitioning by the army alienated peasants everywhere. Haselsteiner recounts the various steps taken by the governments in the Monarchy to try to remedy the situation, yet by 1918 troops and civilians alike were starving and simply wanted the war to end. Mark Cornwall in one essay quotes a Polish soldier writing to his mother from the 10 th Army in March 1918, describing how four men were sharing one loaf and some water. He added: "I think we will all die of hunger before a bullet gets us…Ah dear mother, our dog is better fed than I am here. In the cabbage there are worms… we have to live and fight like this." 70 Ottokar Landwehr, Hunger: Die Erschöpfungsjahre der Mittelmächte, 1917 Mittelmächte, -1918 In another essay Cornwall recounts how in Istria in 1918 people were dropping dead of hunger or trying to live off grass and nettles. By this time, 90 per cent of letters handled in Vienna and Feldkirch by the censors were complaining of food supply problems. 73 Almost all studies of the Empire during the war suggest that hunger and war-weariness rather than political ideologies or nationalisms were the true causes of Habsburg defeat. Peter Pastor in an essay 74 on 'The Home Front in Hungary, 1914-1918' records that in 1918 the Hungarian minister for food admitted that the government could no longer feed its troops or its civilian population. Amazingly, the army still fought on till the bitter end. Maureen Healy in her book (see the section on the home front) points out that it was basically lack of food that undermined the Monarchy in Vienna. Finally there is an article that specifically addresses the link between starvation and political radicalism in the Bohemian Lands, namely Peter Heumos, '"Kartoffeln her oder es gibt eine Revolution". Hungerkrawalle, Streiks un Massenproteste in den bömischen Ländern, 1914 Ländern, -1918 .' 75 81 All volumes cover the army's role in wartime administration. Did this amount to what Mark Cornwall has called "bureaucratic-military dictatorship", the term he used in 'Disintegration and Defeat : The Austro-Hungarian Revolution' (1990)? 82 Perhaps not. Recent research suggests that the army's relationship with local bureaucracies may have been more hostile than cooperative. 83 On the highest political level, the fact was, of course, that, since the Austrian Parliament had been closed before the outbreak of war, "Quite unwittingly…Karl's road to holiness has provided the most significant boost to historical research. Indeed, numerous documents were submitted to the Vaticanand subsequently verified, and published extensively in 2004 -from the otherwise closed Habsburg archive. Previously only a handful of historians had been granted (very limited) access to some of the private papers of the imperial family, thanks to their close relationship with its members. Unfortunately this association, particularly with (the Empress) Zita, proved fatal to their impartiality. As a result, though useful articles have appeared, no works of academic quality exist on Karl's life and reign as a whole. In the classic accounts of the downfall of the Monarchy, Karl takes up little space. There, the conclusions are often penetrating but, ultimately, always damning." So what does this latest research reveal? Though Karl has often been credited with a desire to reform the Empire along federal lines (and indeed to salvage it thereby), there is scant evidence that he took any action in this direction -at least not until it was far too late. His early political appointments certainly fail to corroborate this avowed desire. In December 1916, in the month after coming to power, he dismissed the experienced Koerber as Prime Minister and subsequently let the moderate Spitzmüller slip away, even though both men supported the return of parliamentary rule and opposed the abusive use of the autocratic paragraph 14 of the constitution. Instead, he appointed the pro-German Clam-Martinic, who immediately set about fulfilling long-standing German demands by decree as a necessary precondition to the recall of the Reichsrat. Influenced by his foreign minister, Czernin, and his lord chamberlain, Hohenlohe, and cowed by cocksure, clamorous German nationalists, Karl effectively acquiesced in the pursuit of a German course (the so-called octroi), despite his undoubted personal reservations on the subject. The principal measures of the octroi policy were the introduction of German as the official internal language of state (i.e. within the bureaucracy), the partition of Bohemia along national lines (to reinforce German autonomy in the area), the granting of sub-dualistic autonomy to Galicia (to exclude Polish deputies from the Reichsrat and ensure a German majority) and the associated amendments of the parliamentary standing orders. This policy was pursued aggressively by the German nationalists, with tactical endorsements from the Christian Socials and the support of the Poles. It was, however, opposed by all other nationalities. Karl may have longed for the reconciliation of his peoples but he accepted the execution of an iniquitous and unilateral policy which could only entrench division and intensify the nationality conflict. Fortunately for him, the inefficiency of his government (under the leadership of the listless, tormented Clam) and the insolubility of the Polish question delayed the implementation of the octroi until events ultimately made it impossible. In March 1917, the Russian Revolution put the first nail in the coffin of the policy by radicalizing the masses (particularly the Czechs in Bohemia), the political opponents of the policy and the Poles. The Social Democrats and the Czechs denounced it with increased vehemence, while many Poles -now filled with dreams of an independent Poland -considered it wholly insufficient. Moreover, worried by popular unrest and convinced of the need for an immediate recall of parliament, the Christian Socials effectively withdrew their support. Only the German nationalists, and then really only the die-hards, continued to insist on the full promulgation of their octroi. Czernin, hitherto a staunch supporter of the plan, realised that this anti-Slav and undemocratic measure would endanger potential peace negotiations with the revolutionaries in Russia and began to question its wisdom. (He also hoped to enlist the Social Democrats in his quest to obtain peace with Russia and they had already demanded its abandonment as a prerequisite). He also worried about the impact of the octroi on the volatile masses in the Czech Lands. Karl, shocked by events in St. Petersburg and deeply concerned about the spread of revolution to AustriaHungary, shared this apprehension. Moreover, he was in secret negotiations with the Entente through his brother-in-law Sixtus and understood the threat to any possible agreement posed by this repressive, pro-German policy. The octroi had therefore become a menace to peace prospects in the East and in the West, and to domestic harmony. Czernin -with Karl's blessing the most powerful political figure in both foreign and domestic matters -waited to see if Germany could be brought to reason over Alsace-Lorraine, if the peace party gained ground in Russia, and if his own peace feelers in Switzerland came to anything. Indeed, should peace be achieved, the octroi need not be cancelled. By early April, however, peace was no nearer on either front, while the domestic situation -plagued by lack of food, unrest and strikes -had continued to worsen. The American declaration of war on 6 April finally convinced Czernin that the octroi had to be cancelled. The foreign minister believed that the US had now decisively tipped the scales in favour of the enemy and understood that the octroi stood in complete contradiction to the calls for self-determination trumpeted by Wilson. Should Austria-Hungary stand any chance of surviving, she would have to show tolerance and equality in the treatment of her nationalities. On 16 April, Czernin irrupted in a (domestic) ministerial council and put the octroi to the sword. Thereafter, the government sought desperately to appease the incensed nationalists (with moderate success), but did not attempt to reach out to other factions. Thus when the Slav-dominated Reichsrat reopened on 30 May, the government was almost without allies. The German nationalists still insisted on the fulfilment of their demands, but Clam was in no position to put these through parliament. Furthermore, the Slavs now had a platform to denounce imperial excesses and to stake their claims for greater rights and autonomy. Within a month, the cabinet had resigned. But instead of inaugurating a new direction through a bold prime ministerial appointment, Karl temporarily nominated Seidler, a dour Lower Austrian bureaucrat who pursued a non-committal, middle way which satisfied no one. (In Hungary, Karl finally did away with the domineering and intransigent Tisza, but replaced him with the insipid and inexperienced Esterházy, who achieved nothing and had to be relieved of his post after two months when he suffered a nervous breakdown and became suicidal.) Meanwhile, prospects for a rapid peace in the East and the West faded, and the domestic situation continued to deteriorate. And, thanks to the public forum provided by parliament, Austria-Hungary's disunity was visible to the world. In a desperate bid to win back the increasingly alienated Czechs (and undoubtedly out of a genuine sense of justice), Karl decreed an amnesty for political prisoners on 2 July. This measure, which concerned principally (but not exclusively) Czech detainees, was greeted with dismay and anger by the Germans who, for the first time, began to lose their trust and confidence in the emperor. However, the botched execution of the measure also removed much of the goodwill it had generated amongst the Czechs. And the amnesty backfired completely when many of the released men returned to their homelands to resume their agitation against the empire. And here they benefited from the relaxation in censorship and repression which Karl had also introduced. By the summer of 1917, the nations of Austria, though radicalized and less conciliatory and more ambitious in their demands, were still largely loyal to the empire. But this was already the eleventh hour and drastic action for peace abroad and reform at home was needed. However, Karl proved unable or unwilling to appoint the men to carry out these necessities. He considered moderates and reformists such as Lammasch, Redlich and Polzer-Hoditz but each time yielded to pressure from the Germans (and indeed from the all-powerful Czernin). By confirming Seidler in his post as Austrian Prime Minister and nominating Wekerle as his Hungarian counterpart, Karl unwittingly admitted defeat by maintaining the statu quo. The Czechs, the South Slavs and the Social Democrats never had a stake in government and waited in vain for conciliatory proposals. On the other hand, the Germans could not push through their own demands, as they remained a minority in parliament. And by then, the Poles were already lost. By the autumn, any serious prospect of internal reform and pacification had disappeared; the game was up. Karl was a fair, well-intentioned ruler, whose understanding of Austria-Hungary's predicament was often accurate. However, he was naïve and lacking in moral courage. As a result, he frequently submitted to stronger men (such as Czernin) and acquiesced in policies he distrusted. Ultimately he could not satisfy any national or political faction and his stalling, halting, middle-of-the road manner was wholly inappropriate and insufficient in wartime. 90 A similar new edition of the Baernreither diaries is also planned to come out this year or very soon.
The Home Front
Much like the military role of Austria in the war, the home front in Austria-Hungary also fails to receive proper coverage. For example, of the 56 essays published in the first four volumes resulting from the conferences held by the International Society for First World War Studies, only two are largely devoted to Habsburg studies. 91 Recently, however, there has been some positive interest in the home front in Austria. "This study adds a new dimension to the long-standing historical thesis that the Habsburg state collapsed for 'internal' rather than 'external' reasons: the collapse was even more deeply internal than previously imagined. The state was discredited not only in the eyes of national minorities in other parts of Austria or in the minds of weary troops at the front, as other histories have shown, but also in the markets, apartment houses, schoolyards, streets and the pubs of its own imperial capital." However, her emphasis is on the increasingly harsh conditions of life during the war, rather than the nationalities question. As she states (p. 300): "This study has found the roots of the collapse of the Habsburg state in the mundane and every day."
Healy's first chapter describes the effect of the food crisis on Vienna and shows that the Viennese blamed it less on the allied blockade or the loss of Galicia than on the Hungarians, local Austrian farmers, Viennese merchants and fellow citizens. The army was also to blame for demanding priority of supply for its troops. Moreover, despite the poverty of Jewish or Slav refugees, they, too, like established Jewish or Slav citizens, got the blame and were accused of being foreign parasites. The state, of course, tried to counter such disaffection though censorship and propaganda which included the 1916 Vienna War Exhibition. But to no effect. The Catholic Church, in fact, was left to do most of the proselytising for the war, encouraging the virtues of sacrifice (Opferwilligket) and endurance (Durchhalten), while the state invested more hope in censorship or negative information management. Alas, this only stimulated rumours, which the state found difficult to control. It clearly lacked the propaganda techniques of later totalitarian regimes. Meanwhile, its reliance on the family as the prime unit of social control did not work either. Women's voluntary service (Frauenhilfsaktion) could not discipline the unruly crowds of females fighting one another in bread queues or aid a generation of children, no longer subject to male authority at home or school, from slipping into delinquency. The women in the food queues also shouted their disgust at the local and (later) imperial political class while brawling in the streets. Even the Emperors came under attack. They might receive polite and loyal petitions, but since they could not provide food, their imperial aura soon lacked lustre: "The unravelling of Habsburg rule can be understood, in part, as the slow realization among the people that the Emperor could not in reality 'provide' for the state family (p. 305)." By 1918, when the weekly potato ration stood at only ½ kg per person and the Austrian Food Office was threatening further cuts in rations, local politicians blamed the government and said the people could take no more. The crunch came in mid-June 1918; at the same time as an undernourished and illequipped army lost 142,000 men in nine days on the Piave, tens of thousands of starving citizens took to the streets in Vienna and plundered the potato fields around the city. Nearly 47,000 male and female workers went on strike, so that, in Healy's words (p. 306) : "we can see a 'convergence of collapse' in both realms of the total war." The Emperor in October made the gesture of his Manifesto, federalising Cisleithania, but no one, according to police reports, took any notice; they were "only interested in the food situation and they stand rather indifferent before political events (p. 306-307)." By this time the Spanish flu epidemic had hit the city; food supplies then dried up, with none at all coming from Hungary; and rationing continued into the 1920s. The war ended and the dynasty disappeared, "with a fizzle rather with an explosion" in Healy's words (p. 309). The government had lost all legitimacy; it had become incapable of feeding its people and had forfeited all respect. Several themes covered by Healy 
Conclusion
While much has been written on the Habsburg Monarchy and the First World War, clearly there remain many gaps and many opportunities for more research. We need to know more, for example, about relations between officers and men in the army and about other parts of the home front rather than just Vienna. Fortunately, young scholars have emerged from all over the world, many of them brilliant linguists, who -if they can all find jobs -can be relied upon to 
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The historiography of Austria-Hungary's involvement in the First World War, has grown rapidly in recent decades. The debate on the Habsburg monarchy's decision to enter the war, while continuing, lends steadily more support to the view that there was no crisis of nationalities driving its statesmen into war, and that its leaders must share responsibility for the war for backing German war aims as well as pursuing inflated war aims of their own and miscalculating the risks of conflict. Important contributions have also appeared on Austro-Hungarian and Austro-German relations, wartime statesmanship, the command and performance of the imperial armies (generally poor) and navy (surprisingly good), the army's occupation policies, and the experience of Austro-Hungarian prisoners in enemy hands. Equally notable is the increase in contributions to the economic, political, social and cultural aspects of the war and its aftermath. Although Austria-Hungary tends to be overlooked in western accounts, much of the recent literature on the empire is first-rate and adds enormously to our understanding of the war as a whole.
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Résumé
Depuis quelques décennies, l'historiographie sur l'Autriche-Hongrie dans la Première Guerre mondiale s'est enrichie. Les raisons du déclenchement de la guerre par la monarchie des Habsbourg continuent de faire débat, mais avec quelques révisions : ce n'est pas tant la crise des nationalités qui a conduit les responsables politiques à choisir la guerre que leur agenda propre, soutenant les buts de guerre allemands et poursuivant eux-mêmes des buts de guerre propres, tout en sous-estimant les risques de conflit. D'importantes contributions se sont penchées sur les relations austro-
